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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
defendant and since the cause of action arose from the performance
of these activities in furtherance of the employment contract.
As was stressed in previous issues of the Survey, CPLR 302 offers
no objection to the assertion of jurisdiction in such a situation."8
In its discussion of minimum contacts, however, the court
stated that this question need only be answered when attempting
to satisfy the test for "doing business" under CPLR 301."9 Such
language should not be strictly construed by the practitioner. The
Supreme Court of the United States has not abrogated the
"minimum contacts" test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,0
and it would seem obvious, therefore, that this requirement would
subsist under CPLR 302 (a) (1).
CPLR 302 (a) (2): Tortious act distinguished from
resultant injury.
The Court of Appeals, in two recent cases, has either settled
permanently the application of CPLR 302(a)(2) or has paved
the way for decisive legislative activity on a paragraph which
is perhaps the most important section in the CPLR.
In Feathers v. McLucas,-5 the defendant was a Kansas cor-
poration engaged in the manufacture of pressure tanks. A Missouri
corporation purchased one of these tanks and mounted it on a
wheel base. The completed assembly was thereafter sold to a
Pennsylvania corporation engaged in interstate commerce. While
passing through New York en route from Pennsylvania to
Vermont, the tank exploded, causing injury to the plaintiffs. In
sustaining jurisdiction, the appellate division stated that "the
legislature did not intend to separate foreign wrongful acts from
resulting forum consequences." 52  Thus, the negligent act of
manufacture could be said to have been committed in this state.
The Court of Appeals, emphasizing the distinction between tort
and tortious act, reversed, holding that CPLR 302 (a) (2) is directed
only at "a tortious act committed [by a nondomiciliary] in this
state." 53 On this basis, the Court concluded that the defendant's
48 See The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39 Sr. JoHN's L.
REV. 178, 191 (1964).
4 Schneider v. J. & C. Carpet Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 103, 104-05, 258
N.Y.S2d 717, 718 (1st Dep't 1965).
5o 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ; see Angelilli Const. Co. v. Sullivan & Son, Inc.,
45 Misc. 2d 171, 172-73, 256 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1964), wherein
it was stated that CPLR 302 "defines a class of 'minimum contacts' upon
which the courts of New York can obtain personal jurisdiction over non-
resident parties within the expanded area permitted . . . in International
Shoe. ... "
51 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
5221 App. Div. 2d 558, 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (3d Dept 1964).
5 3 Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 464, 209 N.E2d 68, 80, 261
N.Y.S.2d 8, 24 (1965).
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tortious act had been committed in Kansas and hence New York
courts could not assert jurisdiction based on paragraph 2. In
so holding, the Court found it unnecessary to discuss the question
of minimum contacts.
In Singer v. Walker,54 the defendant was an Illinois man-
ufacturer of geologists' hammers. The hammers, labeled "un-
breakable," were ordered by a New York dealer through de-
fendant's mail order catalogue and shipped to New York where
one was sold to the aunt of the infant plaintiff. While being
used by plaintiff on a field trip in Connecticut, the hammer
fragmented and caused him injury. The appellate division sustained
New York's jurisdiction on the theory that the defendant "was
responsible for a continuous tortious act, namely, the circulation
', 55in New York of a defective hammer ...
The Court of Appeals affirmed; however, it rejected paragraph
2 as a basis for asserting jurisdiction, stating that the "tortious
acts attributed to the appellant . . . occurred at the place of man-
ufacture in Illinois and . . . are wholly insufficient to satisfy the
requirement of paragraph 2 that the 'tortious act' be one com-
mitted 'within' this state." -6 The Court, however, determined that
jurisdiction could be sustained on the basis of CPLR 302(a) (1)
since the "appellant's activities in this state are sufficient to satisfy
the statutory criterion of transaction of business as well as the
constitutional requirement of minimum contacts." 57
Prior to CPLR 302, the liberal trend of Supreme Court
cases, such as International Shoe Co. v. Washington 58 and McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co.,59 had a limited effect on the
procedural law of New York.60 Though several New York cases
suggested that "doing business" requirements might be relaxed,1
"presence" remained the sole basis upon which to subject a
foreign corporation to in personam jurisdiction. 2
It is evident that the Advisory Committee, in drafting the
CPLR, desired to remedy this situation and relax jurisdictional
requirements to the extent permitted by federal due process. 63
54 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
55 Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 286, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218
(1st Dep't 1964).
56 15 N.Y.2d 443, 465, 209 N.E2d 68, 81, 261 N.Y.S2d 8, 25 (1965).
57 Id. at 467, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
s 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
59355 U.S. 220 (1957).
60 See Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y2d 281, 287, 200 N.E.2d
427, 430, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 437 (1964).
61 E.g., La Belle Creole Infl, S.A. v. Attorney-General, 10 N.Y.2d 192,
197-98, 176 N.E.2d 705, 708, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1961); Elish v. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry., 305 N.Y. 267, 269, 112 N.E2d 842, 843 (1953).
62 Supra note 60.
63 SECOND REP. 39.
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The Committee Reports expressly state that Article 3 was designed
to take full advantage of the state's constitutional power over
persons and things.64 If, as was held by the Court in Feathers and
Singer, there is a definite distinction between tort and tortious act
and a clear legislative intent that only the original negligent act
itself, exclusive of circulation and injury, is meant to be included
under CPLR 302(a) (2), then the apparent liberalization of jur-
isdictional bases by means of this paragraph exists only in theory.
The question necessarily posed is what was the reasonable intent
of the legislature in enacting this paragraph.
It would seem reasonable to attribute to the legislature a
liberal intent, i.e., to afford New York citizens a local forum for
seeking the redress of injuries occasioned by the act of a non-
resident, done without the state but having its consequences in
New York. When combined with the instruction that "the civil
practice law and rules shall be liberally construed," 6 5 it would
seem that this approach can be reasonably attributed to the legis-
lature. The Court of Appeals, however, rejected this and at-
tributed to the legislature an intent consistent in result with the
former, more conservative approach.
When faced with the expanded power of a state to assert
jurisdiction, as well as the clear intention of the Advisory Com-
mittee to utilize such power, it seems strange that so restrictive
an interpretation was placed on a paragraph of the very section
enacted to secure this end. The distinction made between tort
and tortious act, though "semantically attractive," 66 is a distinction
which ignores the fact that an act does not assume the quality of
being tortious until a tort is committed. Since "the tort of negli-
gence requires damage, and the tort does not arise unless damage
has occurred, the tort clearly arises where the damage occurs." 67
Furthermore, as was stated in Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 8 an attempt to make such a distinction
between tort and tortious act overlooks a vital point. Even though
a product is manufactured entirely without New York, if, the
manufacturer knows "or because of the scope of his operations
ought to know that the object will find its way into New York," 6,
then such manufacturer should be subject to New York's jur-




66 7B McKIxNENs CPLR art. 3, supp. commentary 58 (1965).
67 Ibid.
6822 IM. 2d 432, 441, 176 N.E2d 761, 766 (1961).
69 7B McKINNEY's CPLR art. 3, supp. commentary 21 (1964).
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It is reasonable to assume that the legislature was aware of
Gray in enacting CPLR 302, since the report had but recently
been submitted to the legislature when the Gray case was decided.70
If the legislature knew of Gray, and was cognizant, as it obviously
was, that CPLR 302(a) (2) was modeled on the statute con-
strued in that case, then it is logical to conclude that some question
would have been raised as to the meaning of paragraph 2 if any
great opposition existed to a similar construction.
Let us consider the results of the tort-tortious act distinction.
As was observed by the Supreme Court of Vermont: "To require
a resident to commence his action in a foreign jurisdiction on a tort
committed where he lives, and to transport his witnesses to such
other state might well make the protection of his right pro-
hibitive. . . .,, 7 The United States Supreme Court, however,
in Hanson v. Denckla,72 stated that there must be "some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." 73 Though the statement from
the Vermont court must be interwoven with the admonition given
in Hanson, it is nevertheless submitted that due process can be
served in each case without the necessity of any distinction between
tort and tortious act.
Under the facts of Feathers and Singer, the Court of Appeals
did achieve a result consistent with due process requirements. The
minimum contacts requirements of International Shoe must be
met not only in the application of CPLR 301, but must also be
complied with in each application of CPLR 302(a) (1) and (2).
From this it follows that if the distinction made by the Court
between tort and tortious act is contrary to the intent of the
legislature, and if there are certain tortious activities which would
not amount to "minimum contacts," certain situations would arise
wherein the application of CPLR 302(a) (2) would be violative
of due process.
For example, were X to be injured in New York by eating
poisonous home-made candy purchased by him in a foreign juris-
diction from Y's roadside stand, the application of this paragraph
to assert jurisdiction would not appear to meet the "minimum con-
tacts" standard and hence would be violative of due process. It
is evident that Y, who made the candy, committed no act by
which he "purposefully" availed himself "of the privilege of con-
70 The final report of the Advisory Committee was submitted on January
4, 1961, and Gray was decided on June 14, 1961.
1 Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 575, 80 A2d
664, 668 (1951).
72 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
73 Ibid.
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ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." "
Hence, the position taken that there is a needless distinction
drawn between tort and tortious act in the instant cases does
open the door to the further problem of drawing the line between
the situations where CPLR 302 (a) (2) can be constitutionally ap-
plied and those wherein its application would be unconstitutional.
The fact that such a problem would face the courts, however,
should not act as a deterrent to proper construction of the statute,
but rather, should serve as a stimulus towards meeting the problem
created when combining the due process requirements of "minimum
contacts" with the expanded jurisdictional bases now being
utilized.
CPLR 302(a)(3): Ownership, use or possession of real property.
Tebedo V. Nye,75 one of the infrequent decisions construing
CPLR 302 (a) (3), involved a cause of action for failure to convey
real property. Defendant Nye, after agreeing to sell the disputed
land to the plaintiffs and accepting the consideration, conveyed the
entire parcel to defendant McLaughlin. McLaughlin, allegedly
with knowledge of a prior agreement to convey to the plaintiffs,
conveyed the realty to a third party. Subsequently, McLaughlin
established residence in Florida where he was served personally
under CPLR 302 (a) (3). The court held that irrespective of the
fact that the defendant McLaughlin no longer had any interest
in the land, nor owned any other real estate in New York, jur-
isdiction would nonetheless be sustained on the basis of "the
relationship existing between the defendant and the realty out of




CPLR 305(b), as originally enacted, provided that for purposes
of a default judgment it would not be necessary to serve a
complaint with the summons if (1) the claim was for a sum
certain, and (2) a notice stating this sum was served with the
summons. The CPLR 305(b) notice would take the place of the
complaint for default purposes. In 1965, this was amended to
provide for the expanded use of such notice, i.e., a statement of
the nature of the action and the relief demanded in monetary
as well as non-monetary actions. There is some disagreement as
74 Ibid.
7545 Misc. 2d 222, 256 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1965).
76 Id. at 223, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
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